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Abstract
Reputation-based trust models using statistical learn-
ing have been intensively studied for distributed systems
where peers behave maliciously. However practical appli-
cations of such models in environments with both malicious
and rational behaviors are still very little understood. This
paper studies the relation between accuracy of a compu-
tational trust model and its ability to effectively enforce
cooperation among rational agents. We provide theoret-
ical results showing under which conditions cooperation
emerges when using a trust learning algorithms with given
accuracy and how cooperation can be still sustained while
reducing cost and accuracy of those algorithms. We then
verify and extend these theoretical results to a variety of
settings involving honest, malicious and strategic players
through extensive simulation. These results will enable a
much more targeted, cost-effective and realistic design for
decentralized trust management systems, such as needed
for peer-to-peer systems and electronic commerce.
1. Introduction
The problem of managing trust and reputation in open
and decentralized systems has attracted substantial re-
search efforts in recent years [3]. A large number of work
in this area focus on developing appropriate computational
trust models to learn behaviors of participants based on
their historical performance. Such model uses statistical
or heuristic methods to aggregate ratings on past transac-
tions of a target peer and related participants, from which
to compute a trust metric as an indication of whether the
target cooperates in the next transaction.
Computational trust models have been intensively stud-
ied and demonstrated to be robust under various (strategic)
attacks by malicious peers, i.e., those want to take the sys-
tem down at any cost by many types of strategic attacks,
e.g., by submitting biased ratings to confuse the system
and to make it less accurate in learning peers’ behaviors.
In fact, such models can effectively filter out biased infor-
mation to obtain a correct picture of the peer’s historical
quality, as empirical evidences have shown [4]. However,
these models strongly assume the probabilistic nature of all
participants, ignoring the fact that many of them have eco-
nomic incentives and behave rationally. In the presence of
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rational participants who behave strategically to maximize
their expected life-time utilities, it is still unclear whether
and how well a computation trust model can enforce coop-
eration in the system. As a typical example, a strategic peer
can first cooperate to build reputation and then start cheat-
ing to increase life-time utilities. Although some simula-
tion [7] suggests that existing computational trust models
may also enforce cooperation in presence of both rational
and malicious behaviors, no theoretical analysis has been
performed to justify this.
In this paper, we prove that a computational trust model
with sufficient statistical accuracy can be used effectively
to motivate rational peers to cooperate in all but some of
their last transactions. In such environments the key to
enforcing cooperation is the effectiveness of the identity
management scheme to effectively prevent whitewashing
behaviors, rather than the computational model being used.
This result gives an initial positive answer to the question
whether existing trust learning algorithms in the literature
produce the same effect: inducing the social optimum point
in the system where rational participants cooperate with
each other. This also implies that in a heterogeneous envi-
ronment where peers use different learning algorithms with
certain accuracy to learn trustworthiness of their potential
partners, cooperation may also emerge. Second, we prove
that it is sufficient to use an accurate algorithm with a low
probability while still maintaining high cooperation in the
system. As a result, we reduce the total implementation
cost of the whole selection protocol significantly.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work study-
ing the relation between accuracy of a trust learning model
and its ability in enforcing cooperation in open environ-
ments, as well as analyzing the tradeoff between the cost of
a computational trust mechanism and the additional bene-
fits achieved by using it. Other work developing dedicated
computational models to learn peer behaviors from histor-
ical performance (c.f existing surveys [3, 5]) are comple-
mentary to ours, since our results apply to any computa-
tional learning models with certain accuracy. The work in
this paper is inspired by that of Dellarocas [2]. However
our work is more thorough and different in many aspects:
we have considered both accuracy and cost of reputation-
based computational trust models, proposed a way to use
them in an incentive-compatible and cost-efficient way, as
well as performed empirical experimental studies of repu-
tation effects on strategic agents in decentralized and dy-
namic environments. The most related work to our ap-
proach is [1], yet it addresses another problem of how to
control the behaviors of agents in a centralized sovereign
information sharing scenario. Our work proposes an effec-
tive usage of reputation information that is applicable to a
wider range of applications with different degrees of cen-
tralization.
2. System Model
Consider a P2P application where each participant plays
the role of a seller (provider) or a buyer (client) of cer-
tain resources (a sellable good item or a service) with cer-
tain prices and quality. Let u be the “legal” payoff of a
seller in a transaction if he or she behaves honestly and
yields a good transaction outcome. Example honest behav-
iors are to always ship the item or provide good service to
the buyer after receiving payment. We assume that u lies
within a range of minimal price u∗ and maximal price u∗.
If the seller cheats, i.e., does not ship the good or provides
the low-quality services, it gains a further “illegitimate”
amount v, where 0 ≤ v < ∞. In this case, the transaction
is considered having a bad outcome. We assume that peers
know the lower bound of prices u∗ and that a buyer can
estimate the illegitimate gain v of a seller in each transac-
tion. Such an assumption is realistic: peers can learn these
values by looking at trading history of other peers. In cen-
tralized systems the minimally accepted price u∗ for each
category of services/items can be defined. The illegitimate
gain v can also be estimated easily, e.g., as the shipping
cost plus the item value. The above environment is an ab-
straction of many practical P2P applications with different
degrees of centralization, where participants are rational to
a certain extent. Such a scenario represents, for example,
a centralized eBay-like trading site on top of a social net-
work, or a decentralized market of services. Consequently,
our proposed solution can be used in all these applications.
We consider a computational trust model R as a dis-
honesty detector to evaluate the trustworthiness (reliabil-
ity) of a rating with binary outcome, similar to a conven-
tional spam detector in machine learning literature. Formal
models and illustrating examples are given in the extended
version of this paper [8].
The accuracy of a computational trust model is defined
by two misclassification errors, α and β, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
is the probability that R misclassifies an unreliable rating
as reliable. Inversely, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is the probability that
a reliable rating wrongly classified as an unreliable one.
Such accuracy implies the ability of the computational trust
model in eliminating effects of possible malicious attacks
by biased raters. Practically, a bound on accuracy of a com-
putational model can be measured either experimentally or
via theoretical analysis. Definition 1 proposes an approach
for a rational buyer to select a seller among candidates us-
ing such a dishonest detector.
Definition 1 A buyer uses the following seller-selection
protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 for its transactions:
1. buyer gets the most recent binary rating r on the seller,
considering the absence of a rating as the presence of
a positive one
2. the binary reliability t of r is evaluated using the com-
putational trust model R
3. if t = + ∧ r = − or t = − ∧ r = +, buyer publishes
this cheating detection to a shared space
4. the seller is included for selection if there are less than
k ≥ 1 published cheating detections on it, otherwise
the buyer ignores it.
3. Main Theoretical Results
Theorem 1 shows the relation between the errors
α, β of a computational trust model and its incentive-
compatibility, i.e., its effectiveness in enforcing coopera-
tion of a rational seller.
Theorem 1 The selection protocol Sk = 〈R, k〉 makes
it optimal for a rational seller, to cooperate in all but its
last Δ transactions, where Δ = max{1, 	v∗/(u∗((1 −
)k − k))
}. This holds even in presence of malicious and
strategic manipulation of ratings by sellers, provided that
the trust model R has misclassification errors α, β upper-
bounded by some  < 0.5.
The proofs of this theorem and related ones are avail-
able in the extended version of this paper [8]. As exten-
sive simulations show later on, the above result also holds
for the case peers use different computational trust mod-
els with different inputs and personalized settings, and the
probability of detecting a bad rater is different for each
peer. In those situations where there are certain (usually
small) probabilities that an intrinsically honest seller ap-
pears as cheating to a buyer, e.g., it fails to ship the item,
and a cheating seller satisfies the buyer, e.g., it sends a low-
quality item yet still pleases the buyer. The inclusion of
such probabilities in the analysis is also straightforward.
Theorem 1 implies that if the temporary illegitimate
gain v∗ is very high, e.g., trading of expensive items, the
parameter Δ →∞. Thus enforcing cooperation of a ratio-
nal seller in such a transaction is impossible, which is an in-
tuitive result. If sellers are long-term players staying in the
system infinitely, the number of last Δ transactions plays
no roles and thus any trust model with reasonably good ac-
curacy (α, β ≤  < 0.5) can be used as an effective sanc-
tioning tool to motivate sellers’ cooperation (Corollary 1).
Otherwise, if sellers only participate in a limited number of
transactions, or in case of high k values, very high levels of
accuracy ( < 0.05) are required to reduce Δ, or to ensure
cooperation of sellers in most transactions.
Corollary 1 It is possible to use any computational trust
model with misclassification errors upper-bounded by
some  < 0.5 to effectively enforce cooperation of rational
sellers who participate infinitely or in a very large number
of transactions, even in presence of strategic rating manip-
ulation by participants.
Given rationality of peers, Corollary 1 implies that the
key to ensure cooperation is not the accuracy of the trust
learning algorithm but on an identity management scheme
that is effective in preventing white-washing behaviors. For
example, the establishing of a new identity can be made
costly so that peers want to stay for many transactions
rather than change their identities and start over. For cen-
tralized e-trading systems where trusted parties are present,
a simple yet effective solution to ensure cooperation of all
rational participants even in the last Δ transactions is to re-
quire each seller to deposit an approximate amount Δv∗ to
a trusted third party before being able to join the system.
This deposited sum will only be returned to the sellers if
it intends to quit the system and only if it has not been de-
tected as cheating by k or more others peers.
While higher accuracy of a computational trust model is
generally desirable, it usually comes with higher cost. Ex-
ample cost includes communication and computation cost
to retrieve relevant ratings and to estimate rating reliability,
or opportunity cost caused by missed trading opportunities
by wrong and late decisions. Consider the case a buyer
can choose either a computational trust model R1 or an-
other model R2 to evaluate the trustworthiness of a rating.
Suppose that R1 is an accurate detector with misclassifi-
cation errors α1 = α, β1 = β, both upper-bounded by
some  < 0.5, and with an expected cost C1. Let R2 be
the simple computational trust model N (always trusts all
ratings) with errors α2 = 1, β2 = 0, and negligible cost
C2  C1. Since α, β are less than  < 0.5, the computa-
tional model R1 can be used to motivate the cooperation
of a seller in most transactions (Theorem 1). However, this
approach is costly to deploy. On the other hand, it is im-
possible to use only the naive trust model R2 = N for the
same purpose since the seller can strategically manipulate
ratings easily, e.g., by colluding with others to submit bi-
ased ratings. This use of the trust model N is less costly
and thus more preferable. Theorem 2 proposes a way to
optimize the cost of using expensive computational model
R1 while still ensuring cooperation in the system (see [8]
for the proof).
Theorem 2 Consider the selection protocol S1 = 〈R, 1〉,
in which the dishonesty detector R is implemented by us-
ing the trust model R1 with probability c and the naive
model N with probability 1 − c. The seller finds it opti-
mal to cooperate in all but its last Δ transactions, where
Δ = max{1, 	 v∗u∗(1−2)
}, under the condition that c ≥
c∗ = v
∗
δu∗(1−2) , where δ ≥ Δ is the number of remain-
ing transactions of the rational seller. This result holds in
presence of strategic manipulations of ratings.
If most sellers staying in the system infinitely or long
enough, the mix of two computational trust models in The-
orem 2, has an expected accumulative implementation cost
O(C1log(N)), where a seller stays in the system for N
transactions [8]. Since the cost of using only one expen-
sive trust model in the same case is O(C1N), mixing two
computational trust models help to reduce the total imple-
mentation cost significantly. Hence, given the rationality
of participants, the accurate trust learning algorithm R∗
mostly plays the role of a sanctioning tool rather than the
role of learning trustworthiness of potential partners.
4. Experimental Analysis
We use our generic trust prototyping and simulation
framework for all experiments. The details on the model-
ing, implementation, and configuration files for all experi-
ments in this paper are available online1. Various realistic
conditions are simulated: peers can leave and join dynami-
cally, buyers use computational trust models with different
personalized inputs and settings, and peers exhibit several
types of rating and serving behaviors. We then computed
1http://lsirpeople.epfl.ch/lhvu/download/repsim/
the number of transactions a seller participates from its up
time by using a scaling factor K. K is set such that those
peers with up-time approximating the mean of the over-
all uptime distributions participate in μtrans transactions,
where μtrans is a parameter of the simulation. Experiment
settings and corresponding results are summarized in Ta-
ble 1, whose details are given in the extended version of
this paper [8]. Seller types consist of: s% strategic, g%
good, and b% malicious (bad). There are five rater types
modeled: h% honest, sr% strategic, a% advertising, b%
badmouthing, the rest are those peers leaving no reports
after a transaction.
Three computational trust models were implemented
and used in our simulation to evaluate the reliability of a
rating. We then combined each of them with the naive al-
gorithm N to estimate the total saved cost as proposed by
Theorem 2. The first model L is the PeerTrust PSM/DTC
algorithm [9], where a peer i estimates the trustworthiness
of another rater j based on the similarity between i’s and
j’s ratings on sellers both i and j have contacted with. The
second model X uses the maximum likelihood estimation-
based learning techniques [4]. A peer i estimates the prob-
ability that a rater j is trustworthy so as to maximize the
likelihood of getting the current set of ratings from i and
j on those sellers they both experienced. We also imple-
mented a dishonesty detector A with reasonably good mis-
classification errors: both α, β are less than  = 0.1, and
with a high cost of each time being used, which simulates
a global trust learning algorithm and is used to verify the
relation between the learning accuracy and the cooperation
level in the system with peers having the same input when
learning the reliability of raters. The two models L and X
were used to test the efficiency of the seller-selection pro-
tocol in environments where peers use different algorithms
with personalized inputs and settings to estimate rating be-
haviors. For the sake of readability, in the following exper-
iments we only show the results for algorithm L. Results
for algorithmX are close to those ofL, and results ofA are
even better. The use of other global trust learning models
like EigenTrust [6] in place of the algorithmA is subject to
our future work.
As a base for other experiments, we first estimated the
overall misclassification errors α, β of those implemented
trust learning algorithms L and X under a variety of sce-
narios, depending on the fraction of honest reporting users
h in the system. The most representative scenarios C1,
C2, and C3 for this experiment type are given in Table 1.
The results in Fig. 1(a) with the mean number of trans-
actions μtrans = 50 show that the accuracy of the com-
putational model L is highest in less malicious environ-
ments (higher levels of honest reporters and good sellers),
as we expected. These max{α, β} statistics are then used
in our later experiments as global knowledge of all strate-
gic peers, where we also observe the same trend of accu-
racy statistics. We tested with different values of μtrans
and observed that when most peers only participate in few
transactions (μtrans < 10), the computational model did
not have enough sample data for accurate learning, result-
ing in high errors α, β > 0.5 and thus such a computational
trust model was ineffective in enforcing cooperation.
The cooperation level in different scenarios with vari-
ous fractions of strategic sellers and raters, which is de-
fined as the fraction of good transactions in the system, are
given in Fig. 1(b) for μtrans = 50 (cases C4, C5, C6 of Ta-
Table 1. Experimental settings of representative simulation scenarios.
Scenario s g b h sr a b Result
C1. No strategic sellers, most seller bad 0 15 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1a
C2. No strategic sellers, half seller good 0 50 50 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1a
C3. No strategic sellers, most seller good 0 85 15 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1a
C4. Few sellers strategic, most bad 10 5 85 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1b and c
C5. Most sellers strategic 85 5 10 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1b and c
C6. Different seller types 33 34 33 0 to 100 100−h5
2(100−h)
5
100−h
5 Fig. 1b and c
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Figure 1. a) the misclassification errors of algorithm L; b) Accuracy of a computational trust model
and cooperation level; c) Utilities of different seller types.
ble 1). The case of all strategic sellers showed even a better
trend. We also performed experiments with other extreme
cases, e.g., all sellers, buyers, and raters strategic, yet the
results were similar and thus are not given here. For small
μtrans < 10 the cooperation dropped significantly, as the
learning had no values at all.
In presence of various rating and serving behaviors
(cases C4, C5, C6 of Table 1), accumulated utilities of
strategic peers who cooperate in all transactions except the
last Δ ones were generally the highest, as Fig. 1(c) shows.
Utilities of strategic sellers are close to those of good ones
since strategic peers are enforced to cooperate most of their
life. Our proposed approach works with dynamic joins and
leaves of peers in the system, given that most peers stay
in the system long enough (μtrans > 10 in our simula-
tion). Experiments of using a combination of algorithms
to minimize the total learning cost (Theorem 2) also gave
promising results [8]: (1) the implementation cost was re-
duced significantly while a high cooperation level was still
maintained; and (2) such an approach learned peer behav-
iors faster and during the same simulation duration, the to-
tal number of good transactions in the whole system was
much higher.
5. Conclusion
Our study provides a starting point to use reputation in-
formation effectively by exploiting both its sanctioning and
signaling roles [2] in decentralized and self-organized sys-
tems. The tradeoff between accuracy and cost of such mod-
els has also been exploited to minimize the implementation
cost of a reputation system in such environments. As part
of our future work, we plan to implement and simulate a
variety of bounded-rational behaviors, e.g., peers may use
various reinforcement learning algorithms to derive their
best strategies to follow. Such empirical simulations may
give us more insights to the effectiveness of different trust
learning algorithms in boosting trust and enforcing coop-
eration in presence of bounded-rational behaviors. Our ul-
timate goal is to provide a “cookbook” for applications of
different trust learning algorithms depending on the level
of rationality present in open and decentralized systems.
References
[1] R. Agrawal and E. Terzi. On honesty in sovereign informa-
tion sharing. In Proc. of EDBT’06, volume 3896, pages 240–
256. Springer, 2006.
[2] C. Dellarocas. Reputation mechanism design in online trad-
ing environments with pure moral hazard. Information Sys-
tems Research, 16(2):209–230, 2005.
[3] C. Dellarocas. Reputation Mechanisms. Handbook on Eco-
nomics and Information Systems (T. Hendershott, ed.), Else-
vier Publishing, 2005.
[4] Z. Despotovic. Building trust-aware P2P systems. PhD the-
sis, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, Switzer-
land, 2005.
[5] J. Golbeck. Trust on the world wide web: A survey. Founda-
tions and Trends in Web Science, 1(2):131–197, 2006.
[6] S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. G. Molina. The Eigen-
Trust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks.
In Proc. of WWW’03, 2003.
[7] A. Schlosser, M. Voss, and L. Brckner. On the simulation of
global reputation systems. Journal of Artificial Societies and
Social Simulation, 10, 2005.
[8] L.-H. Vu and K. Aberer. Effective usage of computa-
tional trust models in rational environments. Technical
Report LSIR-REPORT-2008-007, 2008, available at http:
//infoscience.epfl.ch/search?recid=125277&of=hd.
[9] L. Xiong and L. Liu. PeerTrust: Supporting reputation-based
trust for peer-to-peer electronic communities. IEEE Trans.
Knowl. Data Eng., 16(7):843–857, 2004.
